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ABSTRACT
In clinical circles, the concept of “moral injury” has rapidly gained
traction. Yet, from a moral philosophical point of view the concept
is less clear than is suggested. That is, in current
conceptualizations of moral injury, trauma’s moral dimension
seems to be understood in a rather mechanistic and
individualized manner. This article makes a start in developing an
adequately founded conceptualization of the role of morality in
deployment-related distress. It does so by reviewing and
synthesizing insights from diﬀerent disciplines into morality and
trauma. This discussion will lead to three positions: (1) values and
norms are by deﬁnition characterized by conﬂict, (2) moral conﬂict
may entail important social dimensions, and (3) moral conﬂict
may lead to altered beliefs about previously held values. These
insights provide important steps in further developing
conceptions of the role of morality in deployment-related suﬀering.
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military ethics; morality;
shame and guilt
Introduction
Veteran Scott Ostrom, whose story is featured in a lauded photo series of photographer
Craig Walker, is proud to be a marine. On Veterans Day and Memorial Day, he decorates
his car with a marine battalion ﬂag. Yet, he also feels severely guilty about what he had to
do as a marine. The Denver Post (2012) quotes him saying:
I was a brutal killer, and I rejoiced in it. I was bred to be a killer, and I did it. Now I’m trying
to adapt and feel human again. But to feel human, I feel guilty… That’s why I can’t eat: I feel
guilty, I feel sick.
Ostrom is one of the many veterans who speak of experiencing severe feelings of guilt.
Ostrom is also one of the many veterans who are diagnosed with posttraumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD). PTSD is currently the dominant (if not the only) explanatory concept of
deployment-related suffering. Yet, the PTSD concept is also increasingly criticized for
paying too little attention to the kind of suffering Ostrom’s account speaks of, namely,
(potential) moral aspects of military trauma (see Shay 1994; Litz et al. 2009). Psychologists
Litz et al. (2009) argue that, in the last decades, “there has been very little attention paid to
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the lasting impact of moral conﬂict-colored psychological trauma among war veterans in
the clinical science community” (Litz et al. 2009, 696). At the same time, however, mental
health practitioners do report that moral conﬂict is a signiﬁcant element of the suffering of
many soldiers (Drescher et al. 2011).
Recently, the concept of “moral injury” has gained traction. The general idea is that
moral injury is the result of combat experiences that aﬀect soldiers’ moral fundamentals
and, as such, cause suﬀering. Psychologists Litz et al. (2009) have developed a preliminary
conceptual model of moral injury, which is considered to be a stepping stone towards a
clinical care model. The model provides initial ideas about what moral injury entails,
how it is caused, and how it can be treated.
Yet, the development of conceptualizations about moral conﬂict-colored distress
appears to be not only an important development, but also a complex one. Questions
about the nature of morality, how morality can be injured, and the consequences of
such injury are complicated and should be taken into account when working out concep-
tual models with regard to moral injury. When this complexity is not addressed, implicit
and unsubstantiated assumptions about the nature and role of morality are easily incor-
porated, leading to a rather insubstantial basis for the development of both the concept
of moral injury as such and clinical practices based thereupon.
This article analyzes diﬀerent approaches to moral dimensions of deployment-related
distress. The ultimate aim of this undertaking is to contribute to an adequately-founded
conceptualization of the role of morality in deployment-related distress. The ﬁrst part
of this article provides an overview of whether and howmorality is accounted for in preva-
lent conceptualizations of deployment-related distress, namely, PTSD and moral injury.
This overview shows that both PTSD models and the moral injury-model address
moral emotions like shame and guilt, yet in diﬀerent ways. The overview also reveals
that both psychological models employ one-dimensional conceptualizations of morality;
implicitly, both approach morality in a rather mechanistic and individualistic fashion.
The second part of this article aims to formulate a more developed approach to morality’s
role in suﬀering. Therefore, it reviews a number of “alternative” approaches to morality in
the context of deployment-related distress. This review will show that values and norms
are, by deﬁnition, characterized by conﬂict; that moral conﬂict may entail important
social dimensions; and that, therefore, moral conﬂict may lead to altered beliefs about pre-
viously-held values and norms. These insights, we believe, provide important steps in
further developing conceptions of (deployment-related) moral conﬂict.
Shame and guilt in models of PTSD and moral injury
Moral emotions in prevalent PTSD understandings
In the most recent version of the oﬃcial classiﬁcation and diagnostic guide of mental dis-
orders, the DSM-5, PTSD is formulated as “the development of characteristic symptoms
following exposure to one or more traumatic events” (DSM-5 2013, 274). The event is
deﬁned as “[e]xposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence”.
The symptoms include re-experiencing of the event(s), negative mood, outbursts of
panic or anger, and avoidance of confrontation with the event(s) or situations that are
reminders of it (DSM-5 2013, 271–272).
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The central emotion in PTSD models appears to be fear. Earlier versions of the DSM
classiﬁed PTSD as an anxiety disorder, and while it is no more classiﬁed as such, the
most commonly used treatments for PTSD are still generally fear-based (Drescher et al.
2011). It is this focus on fear and anxiety which has been explained as an important
reason why moral emotions (for instance shame and guilt) currently receive “very little
attention… in the clinical science community” (Litz et al. 2009, 696; see also Lee,
Scragg, and Turner 2001).
This does not mean, however, that moral struggles related to traumatic experiences
have gone completely unnoticed. It has long been acknowledged that moral emotions
like shame and guilt can be related to trauma. For instance, “survivor guilt”, which
refers to guilt felt when surviving combat while others have not, is a well-known
concept. Although after the ﬁrst DSM survivor guilt was removed from the criteria of
PTSD, it did appear as an associated feature. Also, the latest DSM had included the
symptom: “Persistent, distorted cognitions about the cause or consequences of the trau-
matic event(s) that lead the individual to blame himself/herself or others” (DSM-5
2013, 272). Prevalent understandings of PTSD thus do acknowledge guilt and shame.
That being said, guilt and shame are approached in a particular way in PTSD models.
First, moral struggles seem to be predominantly treated as symptoms – as consequences –
of posttraumatic stress, not as potential sources of stress. Indeed, potentially traumatic
events as captured by PTSD are those that are characterized by life-threat and fear, and
not necessarily by moral conﬂict.
Secondly, and assumedly related to this particular focus on moral struggles as symp-
toms, PTSD models also appear to employ a particular approach to guilt: namely, one
that understands guilt as a result of so-called cognitive distortions. Such an approach is
not only indicated in the DSM classiﬁcation of PTSD, but also central in the works of
inﬂuential psychologists on the topic of trauma-related guilt. Take, for instance, Edward
Kubany’s conceptualization of guilt. In an article on combat-related guilt, Kubany
speaks of guilt as based on “false assumptions and faulty logic” (1994, 5). He not only
explains guilt felt by survivors in this way, but also guilt felt by soldiers who have killed
in war. According to Kubany, combat-related guilt is based on the false premise of “I
should have known better” (6) or as the failure “to realize that the actions not chosen
would have probably had worse consequences than actions taken” (9). In his latest elab-
oration of a “multidimensional model” of guilt (Kubany and Watson 2012), Kubany con-
tinues to conceptualize guilt as “irrational guilt”. Further, in a short closing paragraph,
Kubany explicitly opposes victims of such guilt to “perpetrators”, whom he deﬁnes as
“socially deviant individuals” who do not experience remorse. In doing so, he approaches
guilt as either present but irrational or not present in a severely pathological way.
In some cases, guilt may certainly be understood as unfounded and irrational. Yet, a
sole focus on guilt as the result of erroneous thinking fails to reﬂect on how “germane”
guilt is, and thus how it should be understood and dealt with. Undeniably, guilt can
also be appropriate.
Some might be inclined to say that moral judgments regarding the correctness of guilt
are irrelevant in clinical practice, and perhaps even harmful. However, a focus on alleviat-
ing guilt through eﬀorts to make veterans feel less responsible for their actions is a moral
judgment as well. Furthermore, some veterans have reported feelings of serious alienation
when their expressions of guilt were met with either implicit justiﬁcation or suppression of
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subjectivity from the side of the practitioner. These veterans perceived the negative judg-
ment of their own actions as an important way to make sense of those actions (Lifton 2005;
Boudreau 2011; see also Bica 1999). Thus, being recognized in one’s own moral judgments
can be crucial to those veterans that grapple with the belief that they have committed
immoral acts.
This brings us to the concept of moral injury, which proposes that moral conﬂict may
lie at the heart of deployment-related suﬀering, and which complicates an approach to
self-blame as the result of distorted cognitions.
Moral emotions in moral injury
In an essay that argues for the nascent concept of moral injury, Iraq veteran Boudreau
(2011) describes why he feels that PTSD cannot capture the key elements of his distress:
I accepted the diagnosis from the VA [Veteran Aﬀairs] and from everyone else, and I’m sure
that my condition was in part that, but inwardly I knew that the greatest pain I felt was not
linked to those moments when violence was being directed at me but when I was involved in
inﬂicting it on others. Post-traumatic stress just didn’t seem to ﬁt. So what could I call this
pain? It felt a lot like guilt, so that’s what I started calling it, but in the Diagnostic and Stat-
istical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) under PTSD there is no mention of guilt, except
for “survivor’s guilt”… The term “moral injury” has recently come aﬂoat, and it applies to
exactly the kind of guilt I’m talking about. (Boudreau 2011, 748)
Upon returning from Iraq, Boudreau started to struggle with a number of actions he had
performed, such as ordering to use “a heavy hand” in house searches and issuing approval
to shoot an unarmed man who appeared to be digging a hole for a roadside bomb. While
at the time he took pleasure in some of these acts, he now feels remorse for them. In his
autobiography, Boudreau states that “I chose to ignore the facts and to ride blithely
through the fantasy without critique” (Boudreau 2008, 207). He says, “I should have
known better”, and he goes on to explain this idea as a revelation. This is a wholly different
view on guilt than Kubany’s notion of faulty logic.
As mentioned, the concept of moral injury is a relatively young concept. Currently, the
most inﬂuential conceptualization of moral injury has been developed collaboratively by
Litz et al. (2009; see also Maguen and Litz 2012). It seems that their conceptualization is
also the only systematic model of moral injury. The authors, all clinical or theoretical psy-
chologists, provide in their much-cited article titled “Moral Injury and Moral Repair in
War Veterans” a preliminary model and intervention strategy. In the relatively scarce lit-
erature and media accounts that discuss moral injury, one will virtually always encounter
reference to these authors, sometimes as the only source.
Litz et al. (2009) do not aim to replace the concept of PTSD, and neither do they suggest
that “moral injury” should be a DSM classiﬁcation. Rather, they aim to bring forward a
concept that captures particular “kinds” of suﬀering in ways that deviate from dominant
clinical PTSD understandings. The authors argue that while some characteristics of PTSD
may overlap with what they call moral injury, in other ways the latter is unique. They state
that while “morally injured” soldiers may display symptoms that are similar to those
described by PTSD, central in moral injury are feelings of shame and guilt. Their deﬁnition
of “potentially morally injurious experiences” also deviates from the ways in which PTSD
deﬁnes potentially traumatic experiences. As a working deﬁnition of such experiences the
4 T. MOLENDIJK ET AL.
authors propose: “Perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about
acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (Litz et al. 2009, 700).
Whereas PTSD models focus on exposure to (threatened) violence, moral injury captures
those events that invoke moral conﬂict, which may or may not involve threat.
In a short paragraph titled “What are morals?”, Litz et al. explain morality as a “code”
that individuals use to “navigate through life”. They further deﬁne morality “as the per-
sonal and shared familial, cultural, societal, and legal rules for social behavior, either
tacit or explicit” and as “fundamental assumptions about how things should work and
how one should behave in the world” (2009, 699). Liz et al. explain that an experienced
violation of the “moral code” can result in profound feelings of shame and guilt.
In line with their speciﬁc focus on certain “kinds” of deployment-related suﬀering, but
not inevitably following from them, Litz et al. also employ a speciﬁc understanding of
shame and guilt. Throughout their article they stress that while commonly used therapies
address judgments and beliefs about moral violations as distorted ones, such judgments
and beliefs may also be “quite appropriate and accurate” (2009, 702). Therefore, they
argue that it is:
important to appreciate that holding onto the idea of a moral self or a moral code may require
that a bad act be judged as such… Rather, the goal is to help the service member or veteran to
move toward an appreciation of context and the acceptance of an imperfect self. (2009, 703)
As such, Litz et al. differ from Kubany’s theoretical model, which tends to frame beliefs
such as “I should have known better” as a distorted thought that needs to be corrected.
In their own model, Litz et al. (2009) use and adapt existing cognitive models and cog-
nitive behavioral therapies for PTSD. “Similar to social–cognitive theories of PTSD”, they
argue “that moral injury involves an act of transgression that creates dissonance and
conﬂict because it violates assumptions and beliefs about right and wrong and personal
goodness” (Litz et al. 2009, 689). The key adjustment the authors make to existing treat-
ment models is that they place moral conﬂict at the center, which they approach as
germane rather than pathological. The ultimate goal of the treatment they propose is
“to get service members and veterans to articulate ideas about the capacity to do good
and to talk about being forgiven and the need for self-forgiveness, even if they don’t
initially accept these ideas” (2009, 702).
Implicit assumptions about morality
The preliminary model of Litz et al. pays substantially more attention to moral dimensions
of deployment-related suﬀering than currently prevalent PTSD models appear to do. Litz
et al.’s model of moral injury takes into account that feelings of guilt may in some cases
and aspects be understood as the result of distorted cognitions, and in some cases and
aspects as the result of reasonable judgments. However, their model seems to implicitly
employ a rather one-dimensional approach to morality, and also to the experiences that
may be involved in moral injury. Before elaborating on this statement, it is important
to take a closer look at what morality entails.
A well-accepted deﬁnition within the disciplines of philosophy, ethics, and anthropol-
ogy describes morality as a total of values and norms in a speciﬁc socio-historical context.
This minimal deﬁnition already indicates the complexity of morality. It shows that
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morality is not only an intra-individual matter, it is also present on diﬀerent social levels
(group, organization, nation) and in diﬀerent social contexts (ethnic cultures, social and
professional subcultures) (see also Baarda and Verweij 2006, 2). An individual lives and
acts on a daily basis within a range of these – often overlapping and sometimes opposing
– social levels and contexts. As a result, an individual incorporates multiple sets of values
and norms, which may correspond but also contradict one another (see Hitlin and Vaisey
2013).
Furthermore, even a speciﬁc set of values or a speciﬁc value system cannot be under-
stood as an orderly and congruent entity. Values do not always join each other in
perfect harmony, they often co-exist in tension and sometimes even in conﬂict. This
becomes most clear in confrontations with moral dilemmas. A moral dilemma entails a
situation in which one is confronted with competing moral principles that one considers
important, but which cannot simultaneously be honored; one principle has to be violated
in order to respect the other. In a moral dilemma, there is thus no unequivocal “right” or
“wrong” decision (see also Baarda and Verweij 2009, 111).
This rudimentary description of morality can be used to evaluate how morality is
approached in diﬀerent conceptualizations of deployment-related distress. This section
will analyze Litz et al.’s approach to morality on the basis of this description. Despite Litz
et al.’s nuanced explicit deﬁnition of morality (“the personal and shared familial, cultural,
societal, and legal rules for social behavior, either tacit or explicit” [2009, 699]), their
model nevertheless seems to fail to take morality’s complexity into account, in several ways.
Morality as a consistent belief system
Throughout their article, Litz et al. speak of morality as a ﬁrm “code” or “belief system”,
and of morally tragic experiences as “transgressions” of this code or system. As cited
before, they describe a morally injurious experience as an event that “violates assumptions
and beliefs about right and wrong and personal goodness” (698). That is, “acts of trans-
gression produce dissonance (conﬂict), and dissonance is only possible if the service
member has an intact moral belief system” (701).
The conﬂicts that Litz et al. describe are conﬂicts between, on the one hand, one’s
“moral code” or “moral belief system” and, on the other, a transgression from the
outside that violates this inner moral code. As a result, they speak of conﬂicts between
beliefs about how one relates to this code. To use the terminology of the cognitive
models on which they draw, we could say that they refer to, for instance, a conﬂict
between the cognition “I do/am good” and the cognition “I do/am evil”. Yet, the
authors do not speak of conﬂicts within the so-called moral code or moral belief
system. They speak of “transgression” of the code or system by an act and, in doing so,
they approach morality as a system of values which may be violated by intruding acts,
but not by one another. Their model thus approaches morality as a coherent and harmo-
nious system rather than as a constellation of possibly conﬂicting values.
Morality as an individual belief system
Next to an implicit notion on the nature of morality (as a coherent belief system), Litz
et al.’s model also reveals implicit assumptions on where morality is “located”. In their
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model, the soldier experiences the self-directed emotions of shame and guilt and, conse-
quently, the goal of treatment is “holding onto the idea of a moral self or a moral code”
through “the acceptance of an imperfect self” (703). So, although the model’s deﬁnition
of morality explains that “a moral code” develops in social contexts, it eventually
approaches moral injury as an inwardly directed experience that does not “speak back”
to its social contexts. As such, it locates moral injury solely within the individual.
At the same time, Litz et al. make statements that indicate that there may be more to
moral injury than damaged notions about the self. The authors state a number of times
that moral injury can lead to a view of the world as malevolent. This suggests that soldiers
may not only blame themselves for moral transgressions, but also others. However, the
authors stop at mentioning that world-views may change, without reﬂecting on its possible
signiﬁcance and consequences.
Morality as a static belief system
Lastly, Litz et al. speak of values and norms as “fundamental assumptions”. They stress
that morally injured soldiers maintain “an intact moral belief system” (701). They empha-
size the importance of “holding onto the idea of a moral self or a moral code” through “the
acceptance of an imperfect self” (703).
That is, their model does describe cognitive self-schemes, which include self-percep-
tions regarding goodness and perfection, as dynamic and ﬂexible schemes. However,
this does not appear to be the case for the “moral code” as such. The moral code, or
moral belief system, is conceptualized as “intact” after morally injurious experiences.
The experiences would only alter soldiers’ perceptions of the extent to which their acts
and personality conform to their moral belief system, it would not alter their moral
beliefs as such. In other words, values and norms would remain rather ﬁxed fundamentals,
about which soldiers would maintain to think in the same way.
Inconsistent morality: incoherence of values and norms
The model of Litz et al. reveals a rather individualizing and mechanistic understanding of
morality, which potentially leads to a limited understanding of the role of morality in
deployment-related suﬀering. Since morality forms the core of moral injury, this is a criti-
cal point, and a task lies in further developing conceptualizations of morality in the context
of deployment-related suﬀering. The next part of this article makes a start in this under-
taking, by using insights of several authors into moral conﬂict-colored suﬀering that are
more in line with the earlier provided rudimentary sketch of morality. In doing so, it
explores how the complex and multifaceted nature of morality may have particular impli-
cations for soldiers’ experiences of moral conﬂict.
Central in the following exploration are the works of physician Jonathan Shay (1994),
veteran and philosopher Camillo Bica (1999), and psychiatrist Robert J. Lifton (2005). All
three authors have written relevant works on the moral dimensions of deployment-related
suﬀering. Both Shay and Bica are cited as coining the concept of moral injury (Dokoupil
2012; Kirsch 2014). Lifton was a key ﬁgure in the introduction of PTSD in 1980 and while
he does not use the term moral injury – which was not yet coined at the time – he was
partly responsible for the attention paid to moral dimensions in the ﬁrst deﬁnition of PTSD.
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It is surprising that the model of Litz et al. neither refers to, nor makes use of, the
insights of Shay, Bica, and Lifton.1 In the following part of this article, all three authors
will be linked to one particular aspect of the moral dimension of military practice.
Bica’s insights will play an important role in understanding morality’s contradictory char-
acter. The next section on social aspects of moral conﬂict will mostly draw on the insights
of Shay. Lifton’s insights will underpin the last section on how moral conﬂict may alter
moral beliefs.
Moral dilemmas, conﬂicting sets of values
The conception of values and norms as a harmonious system, which appears to be
employed in the model of Litz et al., seems to be a belief that many people unconsciously
hold about their own values and norms. It may be partly due to this belief that a confron-
tation with clashing values may have great impact on a person: a value conﬂict can make
someone painfully aware of the potential inadequacy of his or her moral code.
This section discusses three cases of clashing values, which elaborate on the inconsistent
aspects of morality and give insight into their potential bewildering implications. As such,
this section will show that moral conﬂict may be more complicated than straightforward
feelings of guilt and unambiguous experiences of wrongdoing.
Clashing values are most obvious in moral dilemmas. These may be everyday, “inno-
cent” dilemmas, such as the ones in which a person has to choose between a white lie
and insulting honesty. However, there are also dilemmas that imply a forced choice
between two opposing values that both have tragic consequences, which philosopher
Sartre referred to as a situation that will by deﬁnition create “dirty hands” (see Walzer
1973). Such situations can be quite “everyday” for deployed soldiers.
An experience that is often reported by soldiers is that of having denied medical care to
civilians in need, because providing such care would have collided with operational rules
(Baarda and Verweij 2006; Bouchard et al. 2010). Often, operational rules prohibit the pro-
vision of medical aid to civilians because of limited medical supplies. Sometimes, provid-
ing medical aid is also prohibited because of strategic considerations. This was the case in
the following event, recounted by a Dutch soldier to one of the authors.
In Afghanistan, the soldier and his unit were carrying out a so-called good will oper-
ation in a rural area, when the unit was confronted with a child who was burned up to
his neck. However, it soon became clear that the tribe elder was responsible for this; the
burning was explained as a form of punishment. In the context of this particular operation,
it was especially important to gain the trust and respect of the tribe elder, since tribe elders
generally play an important role in creating good relations with the local population. The
military medic that was part of the unit was therefore ordered not to interfere and, con-
forming to these orders, the medic refrained from providing care. Soon after, the boy died
as a result of his injuries. Even today, the medic struggles with this event.
Although such a situation is an obviously tragic moral dilemma, it is important to note
that the signiﬁcance that dilemmas acquire are strongly shaped by the beliefs and expec-
tations of the involved soldier, which are linked to the values and norms that he or she has
developed within speciﬁc contexts. These values and norms shape not only the decision
taken, but also the meaning of the decision. Although all soldiers in the discussed event
were aﬀected by the event, the military medic was particularly disturbed. For him, the
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event entailed a conﬂict between his military and medical oath. He chose, or was forced to
choose, to abide by his military oath, which left him in doubt with regard to his medical
oath, and maybe also his humanitarian ethos as a person.
Conﬂicts within a set of values
Whereas the preceding case concerned a conﬂict between two diﬀerent sets of values
(which in the former example concerned professional value sets), an experience of
moral conﬂict can also entail a clash within a single set of values. Take for instance military
standards. Even if soldiers would only abide by the beliefs and expectations they have
incorporated as a member of the military, they can be confronted with profound
dilemmas.
Such a dilemma is present in the experiences of ex-marine Sarra (see Sherman 2011).
On 26 March 2003, an Iraqi woman approached the convoy of which Sarra was part. The
marines shouted at her in Arabic to stop, but the woman did not respond and kept
approaching. This event was especially alarming because the marines had heard stories
of suicide bombers disguising as innocent civilians. Should they ﬁre or not? Sarra describes
the following thoughts going through his head:
So she’s walking and walking and walking… I’m like, OK, we’ve had reports of suicide
bombers, she’s wearing all black, she’s carrying a bag under her arm. One of two things is
going to happen… Either she’s going to stop or we’d better drop her or [else] she’s going
to blow up and kill a bunch of guys… So she’s walking. She’s walking. She’s walking. I per-
ceived her as a threat. You know what, I’ve got a shot. Two shots. The ﬁrst one I think I
missed her. Second one, I saw her buck. And then the Marines from the other amtrak
[assault vehicle] opened up on her. And I was the only guy in my platoon to ﬁre. And she
hit the ground and when she hit the ground, there was a white ﬂag in her hand, a piece of
white ﬂag in her hand. And I was like, “Oh my God”. (Sarra cited in Sherman 2011, 109)
According to an ofﬁcial investigation of the incident, Sarra indeed was the only man in his
platoon to ﬁre. However, the woman was killed not by Sarra’s ﬁre but by the ﬁre of the
other platoon. Also, the shooting was considered justiﬁed within the Rules of Engagement.
Yet, it did not matter to Sarra. He was not able to work as a soldier any more. He quit his
job at the end of 2003, and co-founded “Iraq Veterans against the War” the year after
(Kiernan 2004). As he later explained, this event changed the course of the war for him
(Chaudhry 2004).
Sarra felt remorseful for not having waited longer before opening ﬁre, and he felt
responsible for the woman’s death (Aronson 2005; Sherman 2011). At the same time,
he did recognize the reasons why he decided to ﬁre. In his notebook, he listed seven
reasons why he had done the right thing (Kiernan 2004). Sarra’s tragedy thus not
merely entails the fact that he tried to shoot an innocent woman because he failed to
see her white ﬂag, but also that he was involved in a moral dilemma. Sarra could not
have waited until he was entirely certain about the woman’s intentions; if she was a
suicide bomber, the troops would have found out when it was already too late. The key
conﬂict that emerged here was between two moral obligations of which we can assume
that soldiers particularly feel they should abide by: respecting the lives of non-combatants
and protecting one’s “brothers in arms”. In situations like these, a soldier cannot do both at
the same time.
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Crumbling warrior mythology
As the discussed examples indicate, the experience of particular values conﬂicts can also
generate more fundamental conﬂicts concerning one’s deeply held convictions and prin-
ciples. Soldiers may start to question the moral standards in which they once deeply
believed. Take, for instance, the following reﬂections of a US soldier:
“I’m 22 years old and I must have killed 30 people. The same thing that you were given
badges for, over in Iraq, you would be considered a serial killer over here. That’s a very
weird thought to have running around in your head when it’s dark, going to sleep, or late
at night”. US soldier in the documentary Beer is Cheaper than Therapy (De Vries 2011).
Or take the words of veteran Ostrom, who was cited in the introduction. Ostrom said he
“was bred to be a killer” and “rejoiced” in being one. However, in trying to re-adapt to
civilian life and to feel “human” again, he feels guilty.
Camillo “Mac” Bica, a Vietnam veteran who became doctor of philosophy, describes
these kinds of conﬂicts as well. According to Bica, the etiology of moral injury lies in
the inherent conﬂict between civilian and military values (Bica 1999). Drawing, inter
alia, on the famous argument of Grossman (1995), Bica maintains that it all starts at mili-
tary education. Here, soldiers are transformed from civilians, who are raised with an aver-
sion to killing, into warriors, who are “desensitized” regarding the killing of others. In the
“warrior mythology”, war is necessary and just, and the warrior is noble and righteous.
However, Bica argues, this mythology is the complete opposite of the “existential reality
of war”. In war, he says, a soldier is hit by the realization that war is chaos, and sometimes
completely pointless. War is a world in which personal survival and revenge prevail, facts
that go against the values in which the soldier deeply believed. As a result, the soldier’s
mythology of warriors as righteous men crumbles down, and “serious doubts arise regard-
ing the necessity and justness of the enterprise and the nobility and righteousness of the
warriors’ involvement in it” (Bica 1999, 87).
Bica argues that when soldiers have had their warrior myth crumbled by the “irreconcil-
able demands of the combat situation” (1999, 89), they experience profound disorientation
after returning home. What the soldier quoted earlier describes about the diﬀerence between
moral standards held in Iraq and the US seems similar to what Bica terms “moral identity
confusion”. By this, Bica refers to the feeling of being torn between a civilian world, with
values about killing which they recognize as once being their own, and the martial world
of war and killing, which the soldiers are now part of. In the worst case, Bica argues, this
disconnection could lead to the feeling that one’s life no longer has meaning, one’s world
has become disjointed, and relations with others have become incomprehensible.
The above examples show that morality is a multi-faceted phenomenon. An important
implication of morality’s complex nature is that soldiers may be confronted with value
conﬂict on several levels. These may involve, among others, conﬂicts within a single set
of values (e.g. respecting and protecting human life), conﬂicts between two professional
sets of values (e.g. medical and military), and conﬂicts between societal sets of values
(“military” and “civilian”). Importantly, these diﬀerent conﬂicts cannot be neatly separ-
ated. Instead, an event often is signiﬁcant at several moral levels at the same time. Also,
a moral conﬂict surrounding a particular event can engender fundamental moral
conﬂicts that go beyond that event, as also indicated in Bica’s argument and Sarra’s
account. Sarra experienced severe guilt and, at the same time, he understood his actions
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within the context of the inevitably conﬂicting moral obligations of that situation and of
war itself; the event led him to co-found “Iraq Veterans against the War”.
The moral conﬂicts described above are of a more complicated kind than those that Litz
et al. describe. It remains true that, in some cases, an event may be experienced as a
straightforward transgression and, in some cases, this experience, as well as the resulting
feelings of guilt and shame, can be understood as either distorted or accurate. But in many
other cases, the conﬂict appears to entail not only a contradiction between an act and one’s
“moral code”, but also contradictions between or within moral codes as such. Such
conﬂicts complicate the above distinctions between an inner moral code and a transgres-
sion that violates this moral code, and between distorted or accurate guilt.
Social dimensions of moral conﬂict: embittered by an imperfect military
and society
Moral conﬂict has so far been discussed as an individual and inwardly directed conﬂict.
Yet, the preceding section showed that the values involved in moral conﬂict as well as
potential transgressions of those values are not completely intra-individual matters.
Instead, moral conﬂict was shown to be embedded in a social context.
This social dimension of moral conﬂict indicates that “moral injury” may also entail
moral thoughts and emotions like blame, which are generated by an exterior cause and
thus are outwardly directed. The following anecdote suggests this indeed to be the case:
College student Joey Glick…was halfway into his presentation when Quentin, a soldier who
came as part of a local PTSD support group, raised his hand. “I have a question for you, but
I’m not sure if you can answer it for me”, he asked as he gestured at the PowerPoint slide on
the screen. “I’m listening to you say all this stuﬀ about PTSD, and TBI, and the ABCs. But,
can you tell me why we are in Afghanistan?” (Scandlyn and Hautzinger 2014, 14)
Although student Joey had studied how chaplains respond to soldiers’ mental health pro-
blems, his research had not enabled him to answer the question. As he later wrote in his
thesis: “none of my informants saw a reason to engage political or moral questions when
counseling soldiers or their families” (Scandlyn and Hautzinger 2014, 15).
Scandlyn and Hautzinger remark that the question of soldier Quentin shows the “narrow
focus of PTSD”, but also note that “moral injury” – in its current conceptualization– is limited
as well, “for it encapsulates suﬀering and keeps the emphasis on the individual soldier and his
or her actions and away from the political andmilitary leaders who ordered them into combat
and the civilians, willingly or not, who stand behind them” (2014, 15).
We saw that Bica does contextualize the moral dimensions of combat-related suﬀering,
in understanding moral conﬂict as being profoundly disillusioned by previously held mili-
tary values. Achilles in Vietnam by Jonathan Shay (1994), a psychiatrist and former VA
clinician, sheds further light on possible social dimensions of moral conﬂict. Moreover,
unlike Bica, Shay’s insights also show the complicated ways in which morally injured sol-
diers relate to civilian morality.
Disenchanted by the army’s morality
Shay argues that the army can be seen as a moral construction. The shared expectations
and values of the army form a moral universe that are seen by soldiers as “legitimate,
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‘natural’, and personally binding” (1994, 6). The morality of a soldier is thus intimately
linked to and dependent on the morality of the military organization, which goes so far
as that the army can make soldiers willing to jeopardize their own lives.
Because of the speciﬁc and strong moral relation between a soldier and the army,
Shay explains, its violation by the latter can have catastrophic consequences. In one
section, Shay quotes a sergeant discussing an experience of such a violation. One
morning, after a night of ﬁghting, the sergeant and his unit found out that the
enemy they thought they had killed consisted of ﬁshermen and children, an experience
of horror for the sergeant. However, the sergeant’s superiors merely said “that’s the
hazards of war. They were in the wrong place”. They said: “you guys party”, “Erase
that”, “Move on”. And so, however terrible the sergeant found the realization that
his unit had killed innocent people, the sergeant also told his men not to “worry
about it” (1994, 71). This event had seriously aﬀected the sergeant. What happened
here was that the sergeant’s own experience and perception of the event were comple-
tely denied by his commanders. Further, the sergeant had complied with this denial by
also telling his own men “don’t worry about it”. It was an experience that Shay calls
“the betrayal of ‘what’s right’”, committed by individuals who symbolically and literally
personify the military organization, and who thus form a central moral authority in the
soldier’s world (1994, 71).
Shay discovers the consequences of moral betrayal to be devastating. In his clinical
practice, he was confronted with soldiers who experienced the loss of being able to
think of a meaningful future, who had an overall mistrustful or even hostile attitude
towards people, and experienced feelings of helplessness and hopelessness and mistrust
of ideals. In other words, Shay observed a persistent shrinking of soldiers’ “temporal
horizon”, their “social horizon”, and their “moral horizon” (1994, 176).
To Shay’s understanding of “the betrayal of ‘what’s right’” we may add that moral
betrayal can also be less explicit. Boudreau, the veteran who believes that “moral
injury” better applies to his experiences than “PTSD”, explains in his biography: “I just
wanted to… follow orders. I was content with that. But then I went to Iraq, and all
those ideals that saturated my leaders’ rhetoric, and saturated my mind, went rotten…
I knew my ideals had slipped away” (Boudreau 2008, 189). Besides the feeling of being
betrayed by false impetus, Boudreau describes how he now realizes that he was trained
to kill without reﬂecting on what killing entailed:
when a Marine shoots better than his peers, he’s admired and he’s handed medals and badges
and promotions – all to encourage him to pull the trigger with another man in his sights and
kill him. Like it or not that’s desensitization. But desensitization doesn’t eliminate morality
from the consciousness. It merely postpones cogitation (ibid).
Disenchanted by society’s morality
Shay also discusses, although more brieﬂy and less systematically, how the reactions of
civilians connect to deployment-related suﬀering. Shay speaks of US society as covered
with a “cloak of safety” – a cloak that soldiers struggling with moral conﬂicts have lost.
Arguably, the existence of such a “cloak of safety” could lead civilians to choose to avoid
raw accounts of trauma, as it may lead to the questioning of their moral beliefs, and “leaves
us terriﬁed and disoriented” (1994, 37). Although Shay ﬁnds this attitude understandable,
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since it stems from the moral construction of “normal human life” (1994, 194), he stresses
how it can hinder healing.
Being blamed for the war can be particularly harmful. In the introduction to his book,
Shay cites a soldier saying: “When I ﬁrst came back it was like I was living under a toilet
and every ﬁve minutes somebody had diarrhea on me” (1994, xix). In another work more
speciﬁcally on veterans’ homecoming, Shay discusses how veterans blame civilians and
politicians for refusing to take any responsibility for the war, and thus for indirectly
putting all blame on the veterans (2002, 102–103).
The observations of Shay indicate that most people do want to have their armed forces
to protect their interests, but are simultaneously uncomfortable with violence and death.
To Shay’s arguments we may add the following. A “cloak of safety” does not merely shape
society’s general attitude towards soldiers, but also aﬀects them in a very direct way. In
democratic societies, decision-making on military missions lies in the hands of politicians
and, since politicians are elected, also in those of society’s citizens. Indirectly, society thus
inﬂuences the conditions and operational rules under which soldiers have to operate. The
direct involvement of politicians and civilians in military missions, and the simultaneous
denial of this involvement by many of them, seems to be what a soldier like Quentin
describes when asking civilians “why we are in Afghanistan”.
To turn back to Shay, his overarching argument appears to be that “war can destroy the
social contract binding soldiers to each other, to their commanders, and to the society that
raised them as an army” (1994, 17). Shay understands moral injury as not merely the result
of committing moral violations, but also of the experience of moral betrayal by others. The
military organization may tend to justify those events that are experienced as moral trans-
gressions, and society may not want to hear about it at all. Both can be seen as a form of
denial, leading soldiers to deeply distrust their world and even to turn against war itself, as
ex-marine Sarra did. This conception indeed corresponds with a study of veterans’
accounts, which found loss of trust or a sense of betrayal to be the most frequent theme
(Vargas et al. 2013).
Litz et al. argue that the self-blaming of suﬀering soldiers should in some cases be
understood as accurate rather than distorted, and therefore they aim to work toward
“the acceptance of an imperfect self”. Shay’s insights can be read as an addition concerning
the blaming of others. The view of some soldiers that the world is not as benevolent and
just as previously thought is described by Shay not as a distorted view, but a real one. What
follows is that moral conﬂict may not only result in acquired insight into the “imperfect
self”, but in some cases also into an “imperfect” military or society.
Changed views on morality: questioning previous moral beliefs
When soldiers have been agonizingly confronted with the moral “imperfection” of them-
selves and/or others, what may happen to their ethical views? That is, what may happen to
the ways they think about the phenomenon of morality as such?
According to Litz et al., feelings of guilt and shame indicate that one’s moral beliefs
and expectations are maintained, because the experience of a transgression as “disso-
nance is only possible if the service member has an intact moral belief system”
(2009, 701). While moral emotions indeed indicate the presence of moral standards,
the idea that soldiers’ ethical beliefs remain unaltered after morally confronting
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events requires investigation. The work of psychiatrist Lifton provides interesting
insights into this question.
Counterfeit universes
In line with Bica, Lifton (2005) describes how soldiers may be confronted with the bizarre
and morally absurd reality of war, a reality which is in direct conﬂict with the romantic
notions of heroism that prevail at home. Soldiers may witness, experience, or cause
suﬀering to which they cannot possibly attribute a meaning or purpose. Such experiences
lead the soldiers to ask themselves “what the fuck are we doing here?” on the battleﬁeld or,
after having returned home, “what the hell was going on?” (2005, 37).
We saw that moral conﬂicts tied to a speciﬁc event within a mission may generate
moral confusion about the mission at large. Lifton’s work shows that this process can
also work the other way around; Lifton argues that soldiers will develop serious inner
conﬂicts when they cannot interpret speciﬁc war experiences of injustice as something
that happened within a war that itself was just and necessary. Lifton was confronted
with veterans who could not believe that the Vietnam war was “dirty but necessary”
(2005, 39), and who thus lacked any means to justify and come to terms with speciﬁc
experiences during that war. Although Bica shows that moral conﬂict can also be
caused by experiences in wars that are seen as just, it may be more severe when jus-
tiﬁcation cannot be found beyond direct events of injustice. The soldiers that Lifton
spoke experienced the Vietnam war itself as absurd and pointless: some soldiers after-
wards, others already during their deployment. They perceived the war to be like a
movie, and themselves as “boys playing soldiers” (2005, 168). They lacked any
means to tie the killing they witnessed and committed to an overarching purpose.
As a result, they came to see the universe of war, including themselves, as
“counterfeit”.
Later in his book, Lifton describes situations that are similar to what Shay subsumes
under the name “moral betrayal”, which Lifton labels “false witness”. Lifton shows how
“betrayal” or “false witnessing” may not only be done by military leaders, but also by
others. After homecoming, soldiers went to chaplains and military psychiatrists, as part
of their attempts to convert their numbing and isolating guilt into a guilt with which
they could live. By trying to understand their killings as pointless and immoral, and as
part of a meaningless war, they sought ways out of their self-perceptions of being an
immoral person. However, the chaplains and psychiatrists would instead justify and
rationalize their actions. The struggles of soldiers were framed as personal problems, in
their heads, for which they had to ﬁnd a “cure” (2005, 166). As a result, the soldiers
came to experience the “counterfeit universe” not only to lie in the jungles of Vietnam,
but also here, in the home to which they had returned.
Lifton’s observations both correspond with and question the idea of moral beliefs as a
system that remains “intact”. Lifton’s work does correspond with Litz et al.’s argument
that experiences of shame and guilt indicate that someone has not lapsed into absolute
nihilism – it seems that shame and guilt can help someone to preserve one’s feeling of
being “human”. Yet, Lifton’s work also shows that, in some cases, the issue is more com-
plicated. His insights show that if soldiers feel that the moral signiﬁcance of events is cor-
rupted by themselves or others, they may come to view their world as not only morally
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impaired in the sense that it is “imperfect”, but also morally impaired in that it is
“counterfeit”.
Counterfeit experiences appear to entail that soldiers have started to question the aptness
of their ownmorality and that of the world around them. In the chapter called “The Counter-
feit Universe”, Lifton quotes former marine medic and Vietnam veteran Philip Kingry: “The
war isn’t just an excuse. It was everything. I am a lie. What I have to say is a lie. But it is the
most true lie you will ever hear about a war” (Kingry cited in Lifton 2005, 187, emphasis in
original). What we read here seems to be the following: moral conﬂict can not only alter per-
ceptions about the extent to which people actually “practice what they preach”; in some cases,
it can also alter one’s beliefs about what is “preached”. That is, a soldier may start to believe
not only that people fail to live up to the values and norms they preach, but also that those
values and norms as such do not suit reality; that they are “counterfeit”.
Conclusion
Models of PTSD and moral injury show that some forms of trauma-related guilt can be
understood as unfounded, while others might instead be understood as accurate. Yet,
the analysis of the moral dimension of deployment-related suﬀering has demonstrated
that moral conﬂict is a lot more complex than this.
It became clear that moral injury does not always entail the experience of straightfor-
ward transgression. In cases of clashing values, soldiers may grapple with the question
whether the acts they witnessed or committed were good or bad. Such a struggle may
also engender moral conﬂict with regard to the overall purpose and righteousness of
the mission in which they were deployed, which, in turn, may hinder the process of
coming to terms with particular deployment events.
These insights also indicate that moral conﬂict may have important social dimensions.
An individual incorporates various moral codes, learned in diﬀerent social environments.
When soldiers experience an event that makes them painfully aware of conﬂicts between
or even within diﬀerent moral codes, this may not only result in the blaming of self, but
also in the blaming of others. Such an altered world-view might be as accurate and reason-
able as judging the self for moral transgressions.
Furthermore, moral conﬂict may not only entail confrontation with the imperfection
of self or others, but also with the imperfection of values as such. That is, when soldiers
have been painfully made aware of the fact that diﬀerent values or value constellations
can be incompatible, this may shake the moral beliefs and expectations they used to
hold. Soldiers may start to wrestle with the question whether there is such a thing as
good and bad, and such a thing as purpose. Some may come to view both their own
moral conventions and those of the worlds around them to be “messed up”, in the
double meaning of impaired and illusory.
Finally, in all cases – remorse, anger, and counterfeit experiences – it seems that to
interpret soldiers’moral battles too quickly as erroneous thinking is to fail to take seriously
their battles as existential, real struggles. However well-intended, responding to thoughts
like “I/they should have known better” with eﬀorts of justiﬁcation and rationalization may
amplify rather than alleviate feelings of misrecognition and counterfeit experiences. Most
probably, this not only applies to deployment-related moral struggles, but to experiences
of moral conﬂict in general.
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This article is meant as a general exploration, and the resulting considerations call for
more in-depth research on moral conﬂict. It is yet unclear what diﬀerent conﬂicts soldiers
experience, what consequences such conﬂicts may have for soldiers’ beliefs and behavior,
and how experiences of moral conﬂict may be shaped by diﬀerent factors, such as training,
rank, political practices, public opinion, and so on. Indeed, our analysis indicates that
although the risk of moral conﬂict is inherent to the soldier’s job, it also depends to a con-
siderable extent on how soldiers are sent to war and received back home. And so, our con-
siderations also call for further research on how mental health professionals, political
leaders, and society at large tend to deal and struggle with the moral signiﬁcance of war
and violence, and with the discomforting topics of guilt and blame.
Note
1. In a 2013 article on moral injury in military family members, Nash and Litz (2013) refer to
Shay’s insights on the impact of betrayal, which we will also discuss in this article. However,
the authors do not adequately integrate into their model Shay’s emphasis on the social
dimensions of moral injury, nor do they explicitly point out what we believe is a crucial
insight, namely, that blaming of others can be just as accurate as self-blaming.
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